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What We Can Do: Art Methodologies and Parities in Meeting  
 
A toe in muddy waters 
The equally manifest senses of purpose, enthusiasm and urgency generated within animal 
studies groups internationally over the last few years have led many to adopt a position of 
moral virtue and to an acceptance of greater commonality between human and non-human 
animals, bound up in a broad set of sensibilities kindled by the residual sparks of late 20th 
Century race, gender and sexuality conflicts. 
Much has been written and much read and from this basis and a back catalogue of 
theoretical discourse has provided the framework not only of thought, but also of response 
and discursive action. 
The irony in this seems to be that in sanctioning a dependency on the same learned and 
developed faculties, (being those of language), the absence of which in other species has 
been used traditionally to demonstrate our distance from and superiority to non-human 
animals, we continue to distinguish and distance ourselves from, rather than draw any closer 
to our subject and by so doing compromise the possibility of the ‘otherness’ of 
understanding that might otherwise accrue around alternative approaches. Where such 
approaches are attempted, the results are often dismissed as being fanciful – impossible to 
evaluate on the simple grounds of their intrinsic lack of accountability by means of rational 
analysis. 
Whilst it is perfectly possible to imagine a useful analysis of an ‘other’ understanding 
through language, such understanding may prove only to be achievable in the first instance 
by some other means – through for instance the honing and application of intuition and 
instincts – faculties which although they may vary in degree and mechanics between species, 
nevertheless are shared tools by which all species may sense and ‘read’ the world.  In relation 
to anthropocentric perspectives and human superior capacity of self awareness and 
linguistic expression it is worth noting recent research on the brains of whales particularly 
humpback and finback as it has revealed a close similarity to the structures of the human 
brain. Large quantities of spindle cells considered to link us humans to a higher cognitive 
awareness and allow us to feel love and suffer emotionally have been identified (Patrick R. 
Hof, 2006). Hof quoted in the New Scientist says: “We must be careful about 
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anthropomorphic interpretation of intelligence in whales" (Coghlan, 2006). Considering 
that these faculties have developed in whales for considerably longer time than in humans 
could thus possibly mean that their skills of communication including the application of 
intuition and instincts are developed beyond human understanding.  These scantily 
understood faculties within ourselves, despite their sophistication and precision are indeed 
subjugated and marginalised by our dependence on ‘our’ language and as a consequence 
whilst continuing to serve us and our survival in more ways daily than is comprehendible, 
are all too often considered to be it seems, residual, archaic and primitive.   
Art practice, that positions itself between subject and audience, in order to raise questions 
about routine behaviour and habitual thought, offers a way forward which may fly in the 
face of acceptable logic but in so doing, asks disturbing and/or constructively disorienting 
questions. Beyond the strictures of the spoken and written word, its capacity is to deploy 
image, sound or more generally, the speculative juxtaposition of disparate elements and to 
gather and compare observations through an encounter. It does not aim to find reductive 
solutions or conclusions but to instigate the possibility that we, individually or collectively, 
may practically look again and see with new eyes how things in the world are configured. In 
our own (Snæbjörnsdóttir/Wilson’s1) art practice we apply relationality as a keystone of our 
methodology to encourage within the viewer/audience, a greater sense of connectivity and 
hopefully as a consequence, a more holistic understanding. In this respect we acknowledge 
the philosophy of the eco feminist Val Plumwood as exercised in her article Being Prey 
(O´Reilly, 2000). Here she places human animals on a par with non-human animals in that 
just as other species are prey to us, humans may equally be objectified as prey, from the 
perspective of the animal. Similarly, Bruno Latour (2004) in his theories on the collective, 
proposes that we turn the clock back to a time before humans began classifying some beings 
as belonging to nature and others as belonging to societies or culture. In defining non-
humans, amongst other phenomena he includes; species, water currents, machines, 
documents and so on and proposes in his Actor Network Theory or ANT that human and 
non-human be treated alike. His theories and writings have also contributed to our 
keenness to promote relationality as being part of our art practice. The themes we explore in 
our artwork therefore and indeed which are developed in part in this paper, are intended to 
clear a space for the conceptualization of a new lens by which such scrutiny and analysis 
                                                        
1 Snæbjörnsdóttir/Wilson is the collaborative art practice of the authors, Bryndís 
Snæbjörnsdóttir and Mark Wilson. Their art practice is research-based and relational.  
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might be conducted. In fact in contemporary art in general, the presentation of an effective 
framework by which questions are configured is often the most specific intention, allowing 
a plurality of responses to occupy the vacuum that is thereby created. 
 
In this article we hope to unravel the methodologies employed by our collaborative practice 
in which we propose challenges to the anthropocentric systems of convenience that 
sanction a daily acceptance of loss-through-representation, suggesting instead as a way of 
investigation, the alternative idea of ‘parities in meeting’. Furthermore we hope to explore 
what drives our shifting regard for non-human animals (such as it is), the degree to which 
this too is ultimately self-serving and whether it be a fleeting or a growing phenomenon.  
Through the work we ask to what extent any true or ‘better’ understanding of non-human 
animals is related to closeness, empathic alignment or indeed immersion with those we have 
traditionally regarded as the ‘other’. And in ‘looking’ at animals, are we looking towards a 
closer understanding and engagement with non-human species or are we really only 
productively able to scrutinize ourselves as detached, rather than participatory observers?  
 
The human supremacist: a journey into darkness 
  
Maehle and Tröhler (1987) recorded that the experiments of one of Vesalius’ pupils, Realdo 
Colombo (1516–59), involving pregnant dogs, were greatly admired by members of the 
Catholic clergy: 
 
Colombo pulled a foetus out of the dog’s womb and, hurting the young in front of 
the bitch’s eyes, he provoked the latter’s furious barking. But as soon as he held the 
puppy to the bitch’s mouth, the dog started licking it tenderly, being obviously 
more concerned about the pain of its offspring than about its own suffering. When 
something other than the puppy was held in front of its mouth, the bitch snapped 
at it in a rage. The clergymen expressed their pleasure in observing this striking 
example of motherly love even in the ‘brute creation’ (Maehle N.R, 1987,18) 
 
 
In relation to accounts such as these which in today’s terms, for many of us seem 
unequivocal in their cruelty, we would want to orientate the reader at some distant point on 
a spectrum of human/non-human animal encounters – to begin in other words with 
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closeness of kinship rather than with the objectification that is required in order to enact 
such cruelty and abuse.  
When imagining encounters of any kind in respect of other species it may be useful to re-
examine definitions in order for us to clarify, the nature of what is going on. We need to 
look at issues such as contrivance and spontaneity. In terms of the encounter; who if any has 
arranged the meeting; are both parties equally caught unawares – has it happened by 
chance?  
To answer these questions considerations regarding captivity, domestication, wildness and 
the parameters of contact might be helpful. Does the meeting take place under conditions 
where one party does not have the freedom enjoyed by the other? Do the circumstances of 
the meeting or engagement mean that a degree of familiarity between the parties already 
exists? Familiarity and indeed the closely related ‘trust’, suggest a reliance on learning and 
memory.   
In wildness we can presume the least preparation in respect of our encounters to occur. 
Here we may expect the unexpected. In hunting and shooting expeditions, taking place in 
the wild and indeed in those concerned with wildlife photography the relationship is once 
more slewed; the animal has been tracked down, the encounter staged resulting either in a 
dead animal body on the ground or in the analogue/digital traces of some oblivious animal 
being stored on film or the camera’s memory card (Ryan, 2000). 
When we consider the types of communication possible between humans and other 
vertebrates – including humans, birds, mammals, reptiles, we can be confident that in our 
encounters and subsequent engagement, there are broadly three shared senses by which 
communication may be transmitted or received. For us these are; sound, vision and touch.  
Sound is carried predominately through vocalizations – we vocalize and for our own 
purposes might use words, but our intonation is the quality most likely to be effective in any 
communication, just as we may not understand the specifics of what another may be 
expressing but through its intonation we communicate with both subtlety and something 
more akin to parity. 
Despite the faculty of sight too often being considered in modern Western European 
tradition as the most ‘objective’ sense because in fact it is least involved with the object of 
observation, visual signals between vertebrates can nevertheless be extremely eloquent also 
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in shaping our mutual understanding of one another. From appearance both parties may 
express fear, submission, ease, excitement, agitation, boredom, affection and so on by the 
way we hold, carry or disport ourselves. What is not intuited may be learned. Berger (1972) 
has pointed out that “seeing comes before words” meaning that a visually able child 
recognizes through vision before it speaks. He goes on to propose that later in life there is a 
tension in the relationship between what we know and what we see and that tension is 
always active (Berger, 1972, 7). 
To us touch seems to be the most compelling means of letting another know our intentions 
towards the other. By touch, we cross a physical threshold directly and it is through the 
acceptance of touch by the other that in the same instant, we claim for ourselves his or her 
acceptance of us and importantly, we render him or her vulnerable. Simultaneously we 
ourselves must be prepared to be made vulnerable by this process. Perhaps it is for the power 
we identify in touch as a register of trust, that stories abound which indicate that so many of 
us seem intent on absolute proximity, if not intimacy with other species, as a means of 
expressing or exercising an empathetic connection with an other. The desire for an 
empirical manifestation of this trust will drive people to perform acts which may often be 
perceived by others to be alternately foolhardy, rash, outrageously intrusive, dangerous and 
certainly irrational. Ron Broglio2 has pointed out that ‘traditionally, touch has been 
considered less ‘objective’, because it is involved/enmeshed with the other. It can be said to 
embrace intersubjectivity and thus a certain kind of messiness. But an acceptance of some 
scruffiness may be a necessary consequence of unhitching ourselves from the locomotive of 
reason’. 
When researching for the project between you and me (Snæbjörnsdóttir/Wilson, 2009) we 
interviewed a young farmer, Knútur Óskarsson at Ósum in the north west of Iceland.  
Besides continuing to manage a depleted farm business he also ran a youth hostel and 
services for tourists. There is a seal colony on the margins of his farm and some years ago it 
was a valuable resource in terms of its meat and skin. Today the seals have another, more 
intrinsic value as a tourist resource. Óskarsson has not however capitalized on this resource 
directly by charging for instance a fee.  Instead he sees it as his role to inform visitors about 
the seal as an animal whose importance is critical to the nature of this area. It can be 
observed but has to be left to take care of itself. For the tourists he has installed a gate and a 
                                                        
2 A conversation between the authors and Ron Broglio in 2009. 
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fenced off path of about 500 metres leading to the seashore. From there the seals can be 
observed swimming in the estuary or lying on the sand flats across it. The information that 
Óskarsson provides is in the form of conversation - no signs or leaflets are available. In our 
interview with him he described some of the many different approaches people have to this 
animal. 
I mean people are no good some people want to kill them and then I have people 
who want to make love to them and I am not joking just seriously want to make 
love to them. I had this discussion I remember [with] this German girl – I said. “ 
Hey you cannot make love to a seal. If you would get close enough it would bite you 
and it is a bad bite with infection”. This is how it is. I think people have to be 
educated in psychology and I am really not interested in why she had this [idea] but 
I have met quite many people like this and the thing is today people have not the 
right ideas about nature. Many people have these Disney ideas, unrealistic ideas 
about nature – that is the main problem. The second problem is [that] people are 
takers. They don’t respect nature. They don’t allow the seals to lie there and have 
their own habits. They just want to take and consume and then they are gone. I 
remember this German guy who took off all his clothes and this was a warm 
summer night and he was lucky that he did not kill himself because the streams are 
quite rough and then he was standing there totally naked and swam over to the 
other side because he wanted to go and scratch the seals behind the ears or 
something or I mean what ever he wanted to do. He did that and of course the seals 
went away but this was on low tide but then he had this problem – he didn’t think 
this through. He had this problem because he was standing on the other side naked 
his clothes were on this side and the tide came in and there is quite a difference so 
he actually had to walk. [It] took him the whole night, about 18km and the funny 
part about the story [was] not in the next farm but the one next to it is living this 
really nice old farmer Joey, a really nice old man and he was driving on his tractor 
down on the fields [on an] old Massey Ferguson. Then he saw what seemed to be a 
naked man walking on the black sand waving. He just thought I am hallucinating I 
am seeing things that are not real. So he drove home and went into bed again and 
the man was there [waving] help, help… (Snæbjörnsdóttir/Wilson, 2009) 
The acts, which sit outside the ‘norms’ of behaviour will often by definition invite criticism. 
Before rushing to condemn, we should remember that in seeking to examine the nature of 
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communication with other species in any terms other than those of a one-way street of 
human interest and power, (obedience, subordination etc), we expose ourselves to 
accusations of a kind of idiocy – simply because in so doing, we too buck the established 
consensus that animals are either provided for us and must therefore serve our needs, or 
alternatively are to be observed at a distance, (often for human reasons of science, 
taxonomy, surveying, tourism etc) for their intrinsic value – or finally, to be ignored 
entirely.  
Timothy Treadwell (1957–2003) was an environmentalist who over a long period 
conducted his own studies on the grizzly bears in the Katmai National Park in Alaska. The 
study involved living with the grizzlies for 13 seasons before finally, with his girlfriend Amie 
Huguenard he was killed and devoured by the bear(s). Treadwell, made famous in a film by 
Werner Herzog entitled Grizzly Man, was not scientifically trained, but saw himself as a 
protector of these animals (Treadwell, 1999).  
In Werner Herzog’s film Grizzly Man (2005), Timothy Treadwell is portrayed as weak. 
This fragility or weakness, placed in parallel to an exercise of power and control in the guise 
of the director, opens up a different way of looking; one in which the gaze is turned in on 
itself. The idiosyncratic voice-over, and the consistent transparency of the opinions in 
Herzog’s narration, contribute to the exposure of a clutch of binaries; sane versus insane, 
conventional versus unconventional, circumspect versus rash. Similarly these binaries also 
reveal the inconsistencies and gaps in a human being’s authoritative rationality, on one hand 
declaring the deceased to have been a trespasser in the space of the other, but on the other 
exercising a punishment on the ‘non-human animal’, who is not allowed to exercise power 
on or over human animal beings who knowingly encroach on its world. In the film, Larry 
Van Daele, a bear biologist, explains Treadwell’s mistake and what distinguishes him from 
those scientifically trained, in that he tried to understand the bears through attempting to 
‘be a bear’. To empathize is seen to be tantamount to anthropomorphization, the projection 
of human emotion or behaviour onto the animal, a trait often associated disreputably with 
pet keeping and the domestication of animals.  Due to its ‘wildness’, from this perspective, a 
bear is seen to be beyond subjection to such frivolous associations. But in order to 
empathize, to ‘get under the skin of another’, one has to try to imagine how the other feels, 
whether the other is human or animal, and this strategy might instead be seen as a first step 
towards carving a transitional space in which human and non-human species meet on 
renewed terms to the benefit of both.  
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In Thomas Nagel’s essay What is it Like to Be a Bat? (1974) he points out that we know a 
lot about bats, that they perceive the world around them through sonar or echolocation, 
sending high frequency shrieks in order to detect objects and prey within their range and to 
determine from the consequent echoes, precise information concerning distance, shape, 
substance and motion.  Nagel goes on to say: 
But bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to 
any sense that we possess, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like 
anything we can experience or imagine. This appears to create difficulties for the 
notion of what it is like to be a bat. We must consider whether any method will 
permit us to extrapolate to the inner life of the bat from our own case, and if not, 
what alternative methods there may be for understanding the notion. (Nagel, 1974, 
83-84) 
The essay goes some way towards expressing the impossibility of imagining the experience of 
others with any degree of success, particularly when such awareness is based on the 
acknowledgement of profound difference. But if we are to move at all, we must use what 
tools we can and navigate between the recognition of differences on the one hand and the 
identification of similarities, to the heart of what has become a cultural nexus of 
contradiction. It is not only Treadwell who displays anthropomorphic tendencies when it 
comes to the grizzlies. The pilot (Sam Egli) who over the years flew Treadwell out to the 
Grizzly Maze, goes a step further in suggesting that the bears accepted Treadwell for so long 
because of his perceived slight insanity. Interestingly and paradoxically, Sam Egli seems to 
believe that the bears are able to detect whether people are sane or not, and act accordingly. 
He even goes so far as trying to imagine what the bear that killed Treadwell and his 
girlfriend Amy Hugenard was thinking. Similarly, Herzog makes reference to the ‘blank 
stare’ of the bear, signifying dispassionate boredom that can ‘also be seen in strangers that 
we meet in the street in cities’ (Herzog, 2005). 
In Treadwell’s own video footage from which the film was largely constituted, he can be 
seen to ‘encounter’ the bears in a spirit of equality, landing him simultaneously in what 
Donna Haraway has referred to as “concatenated worlds” (Gane, 2006, 145). The fact that 
he met his death at the claws of this species is not a desired end and is not intended here to 
act as an exemplar for the post-humanist interspecies perspective pursued in this text but it 
was an end which in the film Treadwell was realistic enough to envisage for himself. In 
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Grizzly Man Treadwell’s ‘idiocy’ is suggested and played on by Herzog to marginalize 
Treadwell himself and in so doing, to reinforce the old established line between 
preconceptions of ‘nature’ and ‘culture’. It is exactly the inevitability of this cultural 
perception that Val Plumwood took on and challenged when writing of being subjected to 
three death rolls during her near fatal encounter with a crocodile (O´Reilly, 2000).  
Treadwell’s death is used as a demonstration of the consequences that await those who cross 
the ‘invisible line’. It is in fact this modernist inclination to such polarities that sustains and 
activates anew the fear of the other and thus lends a particular and dubious purpose to the 
Herzog film. Had another perspective been drawn it might have acknowledged the 
achievement of Treadwell and the role that his particular, scientifically transgressive, 
‘amateur’ approach played in reappraising boundaries between species.  
What is rarely acknowledged in most stories of human and animal encounters is the 
imposition that such proximity constitutes for the animals in question. In the case of the 
wild animal, the model is already there in respect of our extincting of species, because 
historically we have taken insufficient care to anticipate the consequences of our proximity 
and interaction. Perhaps just as pertinently, in the case of other human cultures and 
civilizations, where the terms of engagement were unequal (i.e not based on consensus 
exchange and trade) our impact has all too often been devastating. The term ‘consenting 
adults’ springs to mind as an equivalence, not in anyway to infantilize the other but as a 
means of identifying the disparity that can exist in encounters between cultures and species 
where the integrity of one party is unequivocally compromised – in short where there is a 
profound imbalance of power.  
 
Limina: meetings on the shore  
When we (Snæbjörnsdóttir/Wilson) propose the concept ‘parities in meeting’, paradoxical 
in its human conceptualization as this may sound, it is with such considerations of history 
and trepidation in mind. And if it is not too fanciful therefore, we propose also an approach 
that imagines a relationship that is uncompromising, between consenting species. 
 
In 2009 we exhibited the installation work between you and me at the Kalmar 
Konstmuseum, in Kalmar, Sweden. A smaller version of the project had previously been 
Comment: Image here: Three Attempts, 
from the installation between you and me, 
Snæbjörnsdóttir/Wilson, video, 2009 
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shown in Australia as part of the international conference Minding Animals in the same 
year.  The research focus for this had been the relationships between seals and humans 
around the coast of Iceland and one component was a performative video work entitled 
Three Attempts, (2009). We had been made aware of the curiosity of seals and their 
apparent preference for bright colors, and in the video we observe Snæbjörnsdóttir, dressed 
in an orange anorak, approach the seashore overlooking an estuary and kneel down facing 
towards the sea with her back to the camera. Our preliminary research had revealed that it 
was common for hunters to imitate seal sounds when trying to entice the seal pups away 
from the cow, suggesting that seals were sensitive to certain types of sound or sound 
frequencies at least. In the initial video performance, a variety of vocal sounds were used, 
from singing to the imitation of ring tones from mobile phones. Initial attempts prompted 
little in the way of ‘reciprocation’ on the part of the seals and nothing very much altered at 
all in their behaviour. The technical reasons why the work was remade are not, in 
themselves, important for this text but rather, the fact that they necessitated another visit, 
which resulted in giving us more than the remake we planned, to the extent that it became a 
completely new work. We are very much aware of the difficulties in attempting to remake 
works and it is something we generally try to avoid. Nevertheless, for the reshoot the 
location was the same, as was the time of year – the same clothing was worn and we even 
began at the same time of day. Even the weather was similar. The only thing it seemed, 
beyond our control that day, was the behaviour of the non-human animals in the water, and 
sure enough, their response confounded our expectations. From the moment we arrived on 
the shore, to set up the equipment, the seals made an appearance, popping up from the 
water, looking, playing, diving and reappearing. The ‘control’ had shifted from us to them – 
it was their game now. Our initial reaction was a sense of despair but slowly and 
convincingly it dawned on us that the only appropriate response was to be ‘with’ the seals in 
this moment. The performer soon relaxed into the role of the one being looked at, whilst 
visualizing the image being recorded in the rolling video camera behind – the back of a 
seated human being on black sand at the shore, the rippling, bright water revealing 
numerous dark heads popping in and out of view, against a backdrop of distant snow-
topped mountains. The process of making this work is described here in order to draw 
attention to the requisite states of vulnerability and surrender necessary for its execution. 
This vulnerability is manifest in an image taken in a natural environment, of a lone figure 
with his/her back to ‘the watching world’. A sense of apprehension experienced by the artist 
is conveyed in the tentative approach of her performance. The unpredictable behaviour of 
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the participant animals required an acceptance of the relinquishment of human control in 
this instance, and indeed its desirability. Three Attempts is the embodiment of a number of 
principles underpinning our work and its functionality. From one perspective the work 
seems a novelty – its charm we’ve observed to be infectious and disarming. From another it 
touches on the absurd – it echoes with pathos and even melancholy. It’s difficult to see the 
work without acknowledging a degree of sentimentality but in common with absurdity and 
vulnerability our rejection of sentiment is a cultured, negative response based on the 
desirability of strength through the application of intellect.  
A current discourse has emerged (most recently and notably in the Arts Catalyst exhibition 
Interspecies 2008/9, Manchester/London) surrounding the potentiality of human, non-
human ‘collaboration’. It was suggested during the Interspecies seminar in London in which 
we took part that the work Three Attempts falls into a category of human/animal art 
collaboration – occupying as it does a space in which human and non-human animals meet 
and interact. In this work Snæbjörnsdóttir chose not to enter the space of the seal (namely 
the sea) but sat instead on the shore, as close to the sea level as possible. Notwithstanding 
this acknowledgement of ‘threshold’, we allow that there was, to a certain degree a division 
of power as it was clearly ‘our’ work; we directed the camera and the scene was framed for a 
project in which the seals had no editorial say.  
When talking about collaboration with animals we have to begin by defining what we mean 
by collaboration. For us it is understood to be an act agreed to by all parties concerned. An 
attempt is made to establish some form of framework where individual powers are 
respectively channelled constructively for the overall benefit of the collaborative project. 
That said, any implicit equality of roles or contribution tends to be compromised when one 
party alone draws up the parameters at the outset, and this compromise may only be partly 
assuaged by responsiveness to unpredictable developments arising from the behaviour of the 
other party. In short, if a way cannot be found in which to negotiate equal terms for the 
collaboration – it’s not collaboration. In attempting to understand the possibilities of 
human, non-human animal collaboration we human animals still seem reluctant to let go of 
the reins or to find ways of working with what is there rather than what we would like or 
can contrive to be there. In this respect we may all too easily be seen to be treating others as 
circus animals. An animal might do unusual tricks for example, or be instrumentalised to 
become the mechanism by which something of ourselves is revealed, but we need to be able 
to see that behind that use is an implicit loss of freedom for the animal, a loss of identity, 
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and a likely physical, psychological or ethical abuse. In short, through representation  the 
animal itself is lost. The dichotomy is one born out of our own dependence on power and 
intentionality and revolves forever around issues of integrity and relationality. If we accept 
the integrity of dynamic relationships we can go forward in this, but with caution and 
respect for matters we cannot presume fully to understand.    
 
The politics of play 
What may not ultimately be easily explained or justified is the purpose of our interest in this 
suggested parity, beyond its being generally a good or tantalisingly desirable thing. It seems 
good because it bucks an accepted behavioural trope in relation to the other. Good because 
in doing so we may discover something which may for a long time have been overlooked – a 
consequence of staying within the bounds of acceptable behaviour and of being so sure of 
our separateness and distinctiveness, when in fact, any natural extrapolation of evolutionary 
theory actually seems to unravel most claims for the specialness of our case. We believe that 
other species may have much more commonality with us than is recognized, which we just 
don’t or can’t see because the type of knowledge upon which we have come to rely that 
provides us with and supports our world view, precludes it. Because we share a world with 
other species, why would we not be interested in the principals of interconnectivity when an 
eschewal of such interest for so long has left us unprepared for all manner of environmental 
effects and consequence? 
Not long after embarking on a trek in Hornstrandir in the far northwest of Iceland during 
July of 1999, our paths crossed with some of the denizens of that area, most memorably, an 
arctic fox in its dark, summer pelage. The animal actually sought us out, clearly having 
noticed us from afar and as he trotted towards us, we became aware of his purposeful if 
casual approach only as he drew near. Hornstrandir is a reserve area of around 240 square 
miles, almost entirely unpopulated by humans. The fox has no predators here and when 
humans show up from time to time he is far more curious than wary. In fact this was more 
the case then, than in 2009 as ten years ago the visits of tourists were less frequent. It can 
nevertheless be suggested that since this was a nature reserve, the fox had also learned that 
humans bring disposable food with them, thereby providing an easy meal for the day.  As for 
us, we were sluggish under the weight of nine days shelter and provisions – he was light, 
inquisitive and in the mood for a game. And this is just what ensued. Once up close he 
began to leap and bound around us, feigning attacks and withdrawals in rapid succession 
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and behaving as much like an adolescent pet pup as is imaginable. The surprise of course was 
not that he was in many ways ‘like a dog’, but simply that he was playing in such a 
disarmingly relaxed manner around aliens on his patch. Both here in the encounter with the 
fox and previously with the seals when making the work Three Attempts we have found it 
appropriate to deploy words such as ‘game’ or ‘play’ in order to elucidate not just the 
apparent nature of the respective meetings, but also a form of exchange or communication, 
significantly, beyond words. It is in a particular type of play involving the feint, the lunge 
and equally rapid withdrawal, the teasing appearance and disappearance, intended there is 
no doubt, to provoke a response, that body language is seen conspicuously to take 
precedence over other forms, allowing a genuine trade of reflexes, privileging intuition and 
instinct. 
The performance of Joseph Beuys I Like America and America Likes Me, (1974) has been 
referenced innumerable times in animal studies’ discourse and will no doubt continue to be 
referenced for many proper reasons in the future. For the purpose of this text we raise it 
again as in the footage that survives the event, an evolving relationship can be detected 
between the two protagonists, Beuys and the wild, but environmentally compromised 
coyote, Little John. The coyote was imported into a loft gallery space in New York, (from 
whence is frustratingly unclear) in order to meet and cohabit for three days with the artist. 
Their relationship begins with a degree of wariness on the part of both – wariness and 
respect. Whilst it is conceivable that Beuys consciously deployed respect in his dealings with 
the coyote and that conceptually this was always strategically going to be the case, the 
documentation of their meeting nevertheless seems to reveal a study in inquisitive 
negotiation and the process of two beings getting to know one another in unfamiliar 
surroundings.  
Back in Hornstrandir, our fox, with all the freedom in his world to choose, bobbed and 
darted around us for a good fifteen minutes as we walked; we laughed and yes, spoke to him 
and around the time we sat down to take off our boots in order to cross a river, he became 
bored and scampered off in the direction of a distant flock of seabirds he’d spotted at the 
river mouth. Ten minutes later a commotion of startled gulls signalled his mischievous 
arrival amongst them. 
Since 2007 we have been researching for a project entitled Uncertainty in the City 
commissioned by the Storey Gallery in Lancaster. As part of this project we designed a 
  14
mobile radio station called Radio Animal3 that we have been touring around England and at 
the beginning of October 2009 we took it to London as part of the Interspecies project 
mentioned above. Radio Animal has been investigating contested spaces and our conflicting 
categorizations of what constitutes a pest. Among those that we interviewed in London was 
the acclaimed historian and one of the founders of the British Animal Studies Network Dr. 
Erica Fudge.  Fudge told the story of a mouse (or mice) inhabiting her kitchen and how by 
giving it a name, she had overcome her antipathy towards this animal. Giving an animal a 
proper name is a common identification strategy in nature studies applied equally often but 
for different reasons by those working scientifically for instance like Ian Douglas-Hamilton 
in his study of elephants (Mitman, 2005) and for amateurs such as Timothy Treadwell in 
his study of Grizzly bears (Herzog, 2005). But as a means of bestowing individuality in 
order to reduce anxiety we detect another more telling dynamic. In 2009 we were invited to 
give a talk at Sheffield Hallam University as part of a series of events entitled Transmission: 
Host, which explored the concept of The Stranger. Our host was Chloë Brown and together 
we made a bookwork as part of the series, in respect of which the editor Sharon Kivland, 
quotes Jacques Derrida. 
the stranger is the one who is irreconcilably ‘other’ to oneself, but with whom one 
may co-exist without hostility, to whom one must respond and to whom one is 
responsible. The stranger reminds one of the other at the heart of one’s being 
(Brown, 2009) 
Applied in this context the statement could be seen to suggest our desire strategically to 
accept the animal through the identification within ourselves of a parallel and 
correspondent ‘other’. A further qualification of this would arise from considering the 
dynamic of naming as ‘owning’ and Fudge herself has described the act as a kind of co-
opting of the mouse into a kind of ‘pet hood’. 
 
We are not alone 
At this juncture, we ask what if intellect alone is not enough for us to understand our new 
and challenged position in the world? Indeed, what if the rationality of our approach 
obscures or limits the possibilities of wider understanding? Ultimately the video work Three 
                                                        
3 www.radioanimal.org 
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Attempts is not solely concerned with our relationship to the seal, but is a ‘landscape’ work, 
that simultaneously acknowledges the integrity of landscape and its constituents whilst 
interrogating what the term has come to represent. The back of the artist is turned towards 
the lens of the camera, which is the eye that we human-animals so easily and often mistake 
as our own in perceiving and understanding the world. It is an insinuation between the 
audience and the event, which it partially occludes. All the readings mentioned in the 
previous chapter, of charm, absurdity, pathos, melancholy, sentimentality, vulnerability are 
indeed embedded and to be found in the work and yet just as crucially, they serve to fuel and 
extend another more fundamental reading – that ‘landscape’ or ‘environment’ if they are to 
mean anything in the future, must cease to be objectifying terms, which describe ‘something 
to be looked at’ or used whilst simultaneously functioning as registers of our detachment 
from them. Just as increasingly we understand that other animals are specifically so in 
relation to the constitution of their dwelling, so we must nurture a larger economy of 
thought and larger sense of community recognizing our own interdependence with habitat 
and the danger that by sustaining our unfettered and exploitative use of  ‘resources’, 
including land and ‘animal others’ we resolutely keep our backs turned on the enlightening 
and rewarding conversation we might otherwise have.  
Where the cultural deployment of animal representations in general seeks or has managed 
to frame and delimit our understanding of the non-human animal, it is hoped that art of the 
kind proposed in the above examples can test such practices and invite a reappraisal of these 
relationships. Because most representations are constructed to perform some agenda of our 
own – in the case of animals, to entertain, to inform, to provide food, to stand for all of a 
species, to symbolize human behavioural characteristics etc – in this process, the animal 
itself is occluded – eclipsed by its avatar or likeness, which is always a simplification and 
therefore must accordingly signify a loss. In another component of the installation between 
you and me the audience is invited to follow at close quarters the transition of a real 
although dead animal body as it is made to become a representation of itself. The work 
entitled, the naming of things (Snæbjörnsdóttir/Wilson, 2009), scrutinizes and we believe 
reveals the flawed nature of the presumption and pitfalls of our attempts to close up and 
enforce a reductive approach in our world-view. In juxtaposition to the other works (the 
series of interviews, Three Attempts etc) in the exhibition it allows us the space to think 
through and thus challenge what we have come to believe it is to be ‘animal’, what it is to be 
‘human’ and what indeed is ‘landscape’ and to consider the consequences of the abbreviated 
forms with which we populate our intellect and our experience. Since it is upon these 
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accepted but polarising constructions that we human-animals base our behaviour towards 
other species and to our environment, at this time it seems appropriate to be digging deep 
and deploying whatever methods may be at our disposal in order to reappraise their 
contemporary validity.  
So with this in mind, consider our experience as we made our way on foot one morning 
along the southern perimeter of Hyde Park in London. It was autumnal, sunny and we were 
deep in conversation as we walked. The traffic was medium, to medium-heavy. The nature 
of the conversation is not remembered but we do recall that out of the blue, we were 
interrupted by a voice, clearly intoned over the noise of the traffic. The voice said, ‘hello’. 
Immediately, we stopped in our tracks. Ahead there was no one to be seen and as we looked 
behind, there was nobody even within shouting distance. The voice came again, ‘hello’ this 
time clearly from overhead. We looked up and there, perched on a telegraph wire directly 
above us was a crow. He/she stared at us inquisitively and as we gaped, said it again. 
Naturally, we returned the salutation and this time the crow reciprocated. We stood there, 
the two of us on the pavement and the crow aloft, for over five minutes, exchanging 
greetings in a bewilderingly agreeable and curiously private encounter on that warm fall day.  
Crows are great mimics. Unlike many species, we recognize and acknowledge their 
intelligence (because we think it is like our own). This bird, free as it seemed, may well have 
been trained when young by a carer, to say some words. Notwithstanding this, to be 
deliberately and formally addressed by a member of another species, so unexpectedly and in 
English, was simultaneously both uncanny and touching and it reminds us of the childhood 
wish exercised so exhaustively in literature and film, that the animals could talk. In the same 
way a contemporary desire is expressed for a genuinely collaborative relationship between 
humans and other species, it’s clear that intentionality is the key to the viability of such a 
project. In the absence of a common, syntax-based language we must continue to look 
elsewhere to facilitate and develop any possible symbioses of purpose.     
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